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Who can refer a question on the interpretation and validity of EU law to the Court 
of Justice of the EU (CJEU)? The most evident answer is a court or tribunal from a 
Member State, as it is established in the EU Treaties. The CJEU has developed a 
European concept of a court or tribunal through case law, but the EU Member 
States have diverse legal systems and there is no uniformity on the consideration of 
some bodies as a court or tribunal. Furthermore, the CJEU has had some problems 
with the interpretation of what a court or tribunal is, has added new criteria and 
has departed from some positions. On top of that, the EU has been growing and each 
enlargement has brought and will bring countries with more diverse legal systems. 
Because of that, the case law of the CJEU should be firm in order to avoid legal 
uncertainty about who is truly empowered to use the procedure. The aim of this 
study is to analyse the concept of a court or tribunal through the relevant case law 
where the criteria have been set and where certain particular bodies which do not 
exercise a pure judicial function have been considered competent to raise questions.  
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The EU Treaties provide that only courts and tribunals from Member 
States may raise a question on the interpretation and validity of EU law to 
the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter CJEU). The reference for a 
preliminary ruling is an important procedure whose aim is to foster 
dialogue and cooperation between judges at national and European level in 
order to ensure uniform application of EU law. Instead of leaving it to 
each Member State to decide which judges can make use of this procedure, 
the CJEU has opted for developing a concept of a court or tribunal 
through case law, clarifying which court or tribunal is competent to make a 
reference. The aim of this study is to analyse this concept through the 
relevant case law where the criteria have been set and where certain 
particular bodies which do not exercise a pure judicial function have been 
considered competent to raise questions. 
  
The preliminary ruling procedure has been very important for the CJEU to 
develop its doctrine and it has significant effects. Consequently, it is 
essential to know exactly who can make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling. The EU Member States have diverse legal systems. This may lead to 
problems because there might be bodies that are perhaps not entirely 
judicial, but are still competent for legal purposes on some issues. Thus, 
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there may be no uniformity on the consideration of some bodies as a court 
or tribunal. Moreover, the EU has been growing and each enlargement has 
brought and will bring new countries with more diverse legal systems. For 
that reason, there is a need for greater soundness on the concept of a court 
or tribunal in order to avoid legal uncertainty about who is truly 
empowered to use the procedure. Otherwise, the CJEU will waste time 
and effort examining competence before admitting or rejecting a 
reference, thereby having a negative impact on the length of the procedure 
and on the jurisdictional protection of citizens. In this sense, problems 
concerning the concept of a court or tribunal have been ongoing for many 
years, as it will be proven by this article. It could be argued that the issue 
has never been entirely resolved. To this end, the author remains confident 
to be able to provide some input and new ground by analysing the relevant 
case law as well as by pointing out problems, needs and solutions. 
 
It is a very sensitive and extremely complex issue due to the differences 
amongst Member States’ legal systems. Considering the aforementioned 
importance of the reference for a preliminary ruling (commonly known as a 
dialogue between judges), the article aims to show how wide the concept 
of court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU is. This is important for 
references to the CJEU to be admitted. The criteria developed by the 
CJEU to establish the concept of court or tribunal will be seen through the 
analysis of the historic case law. From selected case law it will be observed 
how the CJEU has admitted references from bodies, courts or tribunals 
which do not exercise a pure judicial function, which have a dubious 
judicial function or which do not have a judicial function at all in their own 
legal systems. The aim is not only to show the casuistic case law that has 
admitted references from non-judicial bodies, but also to highlight the 
CJEU’s enormous effort to assess the criteria on a case-by-case basis and 
its effects. For that reason the article attempts to demonstrate the need 
for a firmer concept.    
 
The study has been divided into six parts. It begins with an introduction 
that is followed by an explanation of the importance of the reference for a 
preliminary ruling procedure. Then, it reviews the concept of a court or 
tribunal through the classic EU case law which has outlined the concept. 
The fourth part deals with some problematic considerations by analysing 
those cases where the CJEU considered whether some specific courts, 
bodies and authorities could be considered a court or tribunal. The fifth 
section tackles the need for the concept. Finally, the closing section 










II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REFERENCE FOR A PRELIMINARY 
RULING 
 
Articles 19(3)(b) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU)1 and 267 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)2 lay out the 
contours of the procedure for the reference for a preliminary ruling. 
Whereas article 19(3)(b) TEU simply mentions the procedure, article 267 
TFEU further explains it. The articles stipulate that the CJEU is 
competent to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the 
EU Treaties and the validity and interpretation of acts of the European 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies. Although article 256(3) TFEU 
foresees the competence of the General Court of the EU to deal with the 
reference for preliminary rulings in certain matters, there has been no 
development at all of that provision so far.3 Thus, it is the Court of Justice 
within the CJEU that is the sole competent authority to give preliminary 
rulings. In this procedure, which may also be found in the legal systems of 
some Member States such as Germany or France,4 only courts and 
tribunals are empowered to use it before the CJEU.5 
 
The preliminary ruling procedure is one of the main legal mechanisms used 
to settle disputes arising from EU law.6 It is an essential mechanism to 
enable national courts to ensure uniform interpretation and application of 
EU law in all Member States.7 As an instrument of cooperation between 
judges, it provides national courts with an interpretation of EU law by the 
CJEU in order to give a judgment in cases where they have to adjudicate.8. 
This cooperation implies a distribution of tasks between the national court  
– which is competent to apply EU law to a case – and the CJEU, which is 
in charge of ensuring a uniform interpretation of EU law in all the Member 
                                                
1 Consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) [2008] OJ C 
115/15. 
2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[2012]  OJ C 326/47. 
3 Recommendations of the Court of Justice of the European Union to national courts 
and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings OJ 2012 
C-338/01, point 3.  
4 In the German law for the organisation of courts (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) and in 
the saisine pour avis of the French legal system, according to Carlos Divar Blanco, 
Seguridad jurídica, igualdad ante la ley y aplicación uniforme del derecho. Crónica de la 
jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo 2008-2009, Tribunal Supremo, Madrid [2009].  
5 Carl Otto Lenz, 'The role and mechanism of the preliminary ruling procedure', 
(1994) 18(2) Fordham International Law Journal  393.  
6 Antonio Herrero García, 'Cuestión prejudicial en el derecho de la Unión Europea' 
(2001), 23, via http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/152108/TFC-
HERRERO_SP-2011.pdf?sequence=1  (accessed 17 January 2014). 
7 René Barents, Directory of EU case law on the preliminary ruling procedure (Kluwer Law 
International 2009),  278.  
8  Regina Valutyte, 'State liability for the infringement of the obligation to refer for a 
preliminary ruling under the European Convention on Human Rights' (2012) 19(1) 
Jurisprudence  8. 
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States.9 It is the national judge who is competent to decide if a preliminary 
ruling is needed on the basis of the existence of a problem coming from an 
interpretation of EU law.10  
 
Being a fundamental institution for the construction of EU law,11 the 
CJEU has also been a driving force behind European integration where the 
preliminary ruling has played a critical role.12 This is because the CJEU has 
primarily developed and constructed its doctrine through case law arising 
from the preliminary ruling procedure.13 When a national judge decides to 
send a preliminary reference, the CJEU has the opportunity to expand EU 
law through clarification and to enforce it because its ruling dismantles 
national legislation which is not compatible with EU law.14 The supremacy 
and direct effect of EU law impacts relationships between individuals and 
it has made national courts raise more frequently the preliminary ruling 
procedure to the CJEU, which has the monopoly on interpretation of 
questions of EU law in order to ensure its uniform application.15 As such, 
the preliminary ruling constitutes a very useful tool in order to allow the 
CJEU to guarantee such uniformity, while leaving the effective application 
to national courts.16 Thus, the preliminary ruling procedure is designed to 
uphold the legal order and to give a far-reaching guarantee that EU law will 
remain uniform in all Member States.17 
 
A distinction must be made between the reference for a preliminary ruling 
and other judicial procedures before the CJEU. In this sense, it must be 
stressed that this procedure is not an appeal against a law, but an inquiry 
into its interpretation or validity.18 As the aim of this procedure is to foster 
cooperation between national and European judges in order to facilitate 
the uniform application of EU law, any national court dealing with a 
dispute where such law poses doubts of interpretation or validity is 
enabled to refer to the CJEU with the aim of clarifying those concerns.  
                                                
9 Isaac Ibáñez García, 'Tres notas de actualidad sobre la cuestión prejudicial 
comunitaria' (2011) Diario La Ley nº 7591,  3.  
10 ibid. 
11 ibid, 4.  
12 Clifford J Carubba and Lacey Murrah, 'Legal integration and use of the preliminary 
ruling process in the European Union' (2005) 59 International Organization  399.  
13 Rachel A Cichowski, 'Litigation, compliance and European integration: The 
preliminary ruling procedure and EU nature conservation policy' Paper presented at 
the Biennial meeting of the European Community Students Association, Madison, 
Wisconsin, 31 May-2 June 2001,  2.  
14 ibid.  
15 Lenz (n 5) 389. 
16 Joaquín Sarrión Esteve, El planteamiento de la cuestión prejudicial ante el Tribunal de 
Justicia por parte del órgano jurisdiccional español. Los retos del Poder Judicial ante la 
sociedad globalizada. Actas del IV Congreso Gallego de Derecho Procesal (I 
Internacional), A Coruña, 2 y 3 de junio de 2011,(2012),  680.  
17 Lenz (n 5)  391. 
18 Sean Van Raepenbusch, Droit Institutionnel de l’Union Européene (Larcier, 2011), 540-
541.  





There are two types of references for a preliminary ruling: when the 
national judge raises a question about how to interpret a European law in 
order to correctly apply it, or in the event that a national judge asks for the 
review of the validity of a European law. In either case, the characteristic 
feature is that it is a dialogue between judges since the question is directed 
by a national judge to a European one.19 This means that the decision 
about the referral of the question is incumbent on the national judge. 
While one of the parties in the legal dispute may also suggest it, it will be 
up to the national judge to determine whether to raise it or not. There is 
one exception where judges are always obliged to make use of the 
reference for a preliminary ruling; that is the case when the issue is being 
dealt with at a Member State’s court or tribunal against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law.20  
 
Another important thing to bear in mind is that the reference for a 
preliminary ruling does not transfer the competence to deal with the 
dispute to the CJEU. In fact, the CJEU can only pronounce on the 
elements of the question referred to it. Thus, the national court stays 
competent to adjudicate on the dispute and the CJEU simply clarifies the 
interpretation or validity of the European law which is relevant for the 
original case. At the end of the process, the CJEU makes a decision about 
the interpretation or validity of the EU law or an act of the European 
institutions, bodies, agencies and offices.21 
 
In the first situation, the decision of the CJEU is binding for all courts and 
tribunals of the Member States.22 However, this does not prevent any 
court or tribunal to request a preliminary ruling concerning the 
interpretation of the same issue if there are new elements or difficulties.23 
In the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling concerning validity, 
there are two different effects depending on whether the CJEU considers 
the EU law to be valid or invalid. On the one hand, if the EU law is not 
considered invalid, the CJEU simply says that the ‘examination of the 
questions referred to the Court reveals no factor capable of affecting the 
validity of the said Decisions.'24 On the other hand, if the EU law or act is 
considered invalid, then it is declared invalid.25 It also has the consequence 
                                                
19 ibid, 540; Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster [2001] 
ECR I-9445, para 76.  
20 Art 267 TFEU. 
21 Art 267 TFEU.  
22 Van Raepenbusch (n 18) 574. 
23 ibid,  575.  
24 See Joined Cases C-73/63 and C-74/63 Internationale Crediet- en Handelsvereniging 
[1964] ECR 1. 
25 It is invalid not only for the court or tribunal which launched the procedure, but 
also for the tribunals in otherMember States, as stated by the CJEU in Case C-66/80 
International Chemical Corporation v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1981] 
ECR 1191 para 13: ‘It follows therefrom that although a judgment of the Court given 
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that all the instruments which were adopted based on it are similarly 
invalid. However, the CJEU does not annul the act; it simply confirms its 
invalidity.26 By analogy with article 266 TFEU, it shall be up to the 
competent European institutions to adopt a measure to execute the ruling 
of the CJEU and to rectify the situation.27 
 
Moreover, the CJEU has an obligation to answer a question unless it falls 
outside its scope of competence.28 This may happen when the act 
questioned is not subject to this procedure or more likely, when the 
referral is done by a court or tribunal which is not considered to have 
jurisdiction in the sense of article 267 TFEU. The acts which are subject to 
the procedure include not only the list established in Article 288 of TFEU 
(regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions), but 
also the atypical acts provided and not provided by the Treaties.29 
Nevertheless, article 267 of the TFEU stipulates that the CJEU can only 
give preliminary rulings on the validity of acts adopted by the EU 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, whereas it allows the CJEU to 
interpret not only those acts, but also the Treaties of the EU.30 
 
III. THE CONCEPT OF A COURT OR TRIBUNAL DEVELOPED 
THROUGH EU CASE LAW 
 
Only a court or tribunal from a Member State can launch the reference for 
a preliminary ruling before the CJEU. Thus, third countries’ and 
international courts and tribunals, such as the International Court of 
Justice or the European Court of Human Rights, are not entitled to use 
this procedure.31 However, it is interesting to note that the Benelux Court 
of Justice is competent to make use of the procedure because its task is to 
ensure the uniform application of law in three Member States.32 Delimiting 
the concept of a court or tribunal is important because some Member 
States have a unique judicial function, whereas some others have a much 
                                                                                                                                 
under Article 177 of the Treaty declaring an act of an institution, in particular a 
Council or Commission regulation, to be void is directly addressed only to the 
national court which brought the matter before the Court, it is sufficient reason for 
any other national court to regard that act as void for the purposes of a judgment 
which it has to give’. 
26 Van Raepenbusch (n 18) 576. 
27 ibid. Art 266 TFEU stipulates that: ‘The institution whose act has been declared 
void or whose failure to act has been declared contrary to the Treaties shall be 
required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.’ 
28 Van Raepenbusch (n 18) 545.  
29 ibid, 560.   
30 Art 267 TFEU says that: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:(a) the interpretation of the 
Treaties;(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices 
or agencies of the Union’. 
31 Van Raepenbusch (n 18) 547. 
32 ibid.  




more diverse system whose principles are different. To address that issue, 
two options were considered: deferring to the national law of each 
Member State to decide what a court or tribunal is or to develop a 
European concept.33 The second option was chosen since it is more 
consistent with the principle of uniform application of EU law.34 This 
concept has been developed through EU case law and the purpose of this 
section is to analyse those judgments. 
 
The concept of a court or tribunal has been considered on the basis of two 
criteria: an organic one, which considers that the question may be referred 
by a judge engaged by a public order in the framework of a legal 
competence and; a functional one, which stipulates that a court or tribunal 
must settle disputes and shall comply with certain characteristics 
consolidated by EU case law.35 Therefore, the organic aspect would refer to 
the statutory position of the body, with the content and nature enabling it 
to secure its independence and impartiality, whereas the functional one has 
to do with the specific task of an authority when settling a conflict and 
imposing its decision on the parts in the dispute.36 It seems that the CJEU 
is more favourable to the functional aspect rather than to the other one 
when considering what a court or tribunal is.37 Nevertheless, the CJEU has 
never clarified what a court or tribunal is under article 267 TFEU.38 
However, it ruled on the criteria to determine which bodies are competent 
to use the procedure.39 
 
1. The Criteria to be Considered as Having Jurisdiction: the Vaassen-Göbbels 
Case. 
The position of the CJEU towards the organic and functional criteria of 
the concept of a court or tribunal is strongly echoed in the Vaassen-Göbbels 
case.40 This is a historical judgment for several reasons. First of all, the 
CJEU confirmed the European character of the concept of a court or 
tribunal in that ruling.41 Moreover, it is the judgment in which the CJEU 
first laid out the criteria for considering what such a concept is.42 From 
                                                
33 Antonio Herrero García, 'Cuestión prejudicial en el derecho de la Unión Europea' 
(2011), 23; via  http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/152108/TFC-
HERRERO_SP-2011.pdf?sequence=1 ,  (accessed 11 February 2014). 
34 Van Raepenbusch (n 18)  548.  
35 Herrero García (n 33) 23.  
36 ibid,  23-24.  
37 Van Raepenbusch (n 18)  548.  
38 Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger, Preliminary references to the European Court of 
Justice (OUP 2014), 72. 
39 Lenz (n 5) 393-394.  
40 C-61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels [1966] ECR 377.  
41 Van Raepenbusch (n 18) 548.  
42ibid. Fernando M Mariño, Víctor Moreno Catena and Carlos Moreiro, Derecho 
procesal comunitario (Tirant Lo Blanch 2001),238; Marie-Cécile Lasserre, 'Le droit de la 
procédure civile de l'Union européenne forme t-il un ordre procédural?' (2013) 
Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis  66; Timothy Dayton Maldoon, 'A court or 
tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 of the Treaty. The Court’s jurisprudence 
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this ruling, the predisposition of the CJEU towards the functional aspect 
of the concept can also be perceived. In this case, the Scheidsgerecht van het 
Beambten- fonds voor het Mijnbedrijf – a Dutch Court of Arbitration43 – was 
dealing with an issue which required interpretation of Regulation No 3 of 
the Council of the EEC concerning social security for migrant workers.44 
This Dutch arbitration court brought a preliminary ruling before the 
CJEU.  
 
The applicant in the action before the Dutch court was the widow of a 
miner who received a pension from the Dutch Worker Fund of Mining 
(BFM in Dutch). The applicant went to live in Germany on 31 August 1963 
and because of that, was removed from the list of members of a sickness 
fund for pensioners. The widow asked to be reinserted on the list, but was 
refused under Article 18.1 of the Rules of the BFM, so she decided to 
complain to the Scheidsgerecht van het Beambten- fonds voor het Mijnbedrijf.45  
 
The CJEU admitted the request for interpretation. Despite not being so 
considered under Dutch law, it found that the Scheidsgerecht van het 
Beambten- fonds voor het Mijnbedrijf should be considered a court or tribunal 
within the meaning of article 267 TFEU because of several reasons:46  
 
-­‐ First of all, the CJEU considered that the Scheidsgerecht van het 
Beambten- fonds voor het Mijnbedrijf was an arbitration court, 
constituted under the law of the Netherlands and provided for by 
the Reglement van het Beambten-fonds voor het Mijnbedrijf (RBFM, 
Official Rules of the Fund for Mining Company) which governs 
the relationship between the Beambtenfonds and those who are 
insured by it.47 The CJEU also acknowledged that the RBFM and 
any subsequent amendment to it must be approved not only by the 
Dutch Minister responsible for the mining industry, but also by 
the Minister for Social Affairs and Public Health.48 Furthermore, 
the CJEU took note that it was the duty of the Minister 
responsible for the mining industry to appoint the members of the 
                                                                                                                                 
from Vaassen (née Göbbels) to Syfait' (2005), 10, via 
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1560047&fileOId=
1565184,    (accessed  29 April 2014).  
43Although the name of the court may confuse, the case had nothing to do with 
arbitration. Some authors maintain that it was indeed a case of pseudo-arbitration. 
Paul Storm, Quod Licet Iovi…. The precarious relationship between the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities and Arbitration on Essays on International and comparative Law in 
honour of Judge Erades. (T.M.C. Asser Instituut 1983),  146. 
44 [1958] OJ L 30, 561–596.  
45See the facts of the case C-61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels [1966] ECR 377, 263.  
46ibid. The reasons are stated in the subsection Facts in the main action under the 
Issues of fact and of law of the judgement. 
47ibid,  272-273.  
48ibid. 




Scheidsgerecht (Court of Arbitration), to designate its chairman and 
to lay down its rules of procedure.49 Hence, the CJEU recognised 
and accepted the public character of the Scheidsgerecht van het 
Beambten- fonds voor het Mijnbedrijf since it was created by law, its 
members and President were appointed by the Dutch Government 
and its rules of procedure were established by national law.50  
 
-­‐ Secondly, the CJEU took into account that the Scheidsgerecht was a 
permanent body whose aim was to exclusively settle certain 
disputes under the RBFM.51 Besides, the CJEU perceived that the 
Scheidsgerecht was also bound by rules of adversary procedure 
similar to those used by other ordinary courts of law.52 Thus, the 
CJEU deemed that this was a permanent institution, complying 
with the requirements of adversary proceedings and whose 
competences were established by the RBFM to deal exclusively 
with certain issues.53  
 
-­‐ Thirdly, the CJEU noted that the persons referred to in the 
RBFM were compulsorily members of the Beambten-fonds54 and 
they were bound to take any disputes between themselves and 
their insurer to the Scheidsgerecht as the proper judicial body.55 
Consequently, the CJEU argued that the Scheidsgerecht was bound 
to apply rules of law.56 
Therefore, the Scheidsgerecht van het Beambten-fonds voor het Mijnbedrijf was 
recognised as a court or tribunal because it was a permanent body of 
statutory origin, reference to it was compulsory, and it gave its rulings after 
a proper hearing and in accordance with legal rules.57 However, this 
recognition received some criticism based on the fact that the powers of 
the Dutch arbitration court did not rely on any agreement between the 
parties.58 
 
                                                
49ibid. 
50ibid. 
51ibid, 273.  
52 ibid.  
53ibid.  
54 This was done due to a regulation laid down by the Mijnindustrieraad (Council of 
the Mining Industry), a body established under public law.  
55C-61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels [1966] ECR 377, 273. 
56ibid.  
57 Opinion of Advocate-General Darmon in Case C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-
0000, para 5.  
58 W L Haardt, 'Widow Vaassen-Gobbels v. Board of the Beambtenfonds voor het 
Mijnbedrijy ("Tund of Employees in the Mining industry"), Case 61/65. Preliminary 
ruling given on June 30, 1966' (1967) 4 Common Market Law Review, 443–444; Storm 
(n 43) 146. 
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As a result of this judgement, the characteristics relevant for being 
considered a court or tribunal for the purposes of the reference for a 
preliminary ruling before the CJEU were laid out.59 This has been a very 
important ruling because subsequently, the CJEU has verified the 
compliance with such criteria, which have obviously been shaped and 
completed.60  
 
2. No Need for an Adversarial Process: the Politi Case 
The next problem was to consider whether a court or tribunal should 
comply with all those requirements in order to be considered competent 
to launch the procedure. This was answered in Politi.61 This case raised a 
question whether all the criteria from Vaassen-Göbbels should be met in 
order for a body to be competent to make a reference. In particular, the 
case was useful to examine whether the court or tribunal had to conduct an 
adversarial process (i.e. a contest between two opposing parties before a 
judge who moderates) in order to be entitled to make use of the reference 
for a preliminary ruling. 
 
Politi was an Italian undertaking importing pig meat from different 
countries (Sweden, Belgium, France and Ireland).62 For each importation, 
Politi was required to pay a duty and a statistical levy according to Italian 
law.63 The company considered that the charges for importations should 
not have been imposed since they were not compatible with Regulation 
No 20 of the Council of 4 April 1962 on the gradual establishment of the 
common organisation of the market in pig meat and Regulation No 
121/67/EEC of the Council of 13 June 1967 on the common organisation of 
the market in pig meat.64 Thus, it brought interlocutory proceedings 
before the President of the Tribunale di Torino against the Ministry of 
Finance of the Italian Republic with the aim of obtaining a refund.65  
 
The Tribunale di Torino wanted to obtain an interpretation from the CJEU 
concerning the Regulations.66 Before hearing the other party (the Ministry 
of Finance of the Italian Republic), it decided to launch the procedure for 
the preliminary ruling before the CJEU.67  
 
                                                
59 Maldoon (n 42) 11. Besides, all those characteristics have been confirmed in later 
case-law such as: C-14/86 Pretore di Salò v Persons unkown [1987] ECR 2545; C-54/96 
Dorsch Consult v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin unkown [1987] ECR 2545, para 7; C-109/88 
Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, paras 7-8, and; C-393/92 Almelo and Others [1994] ECR 1-
1477.   
60 See Opinion of Advocate General Jarabo Colomer (n 19) para 17.  
61 C-43/71 Politi SAS v Italian Ministry of Finance [1971] ECR 1039.  
62 ibid,  1041-1042.  
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
65 ibid.  
66 ibid,  1042-1043. 
67 ibid.  




The Italian Government maintained that the Tribunale di Torino lacked 
competence needed to make a reference due to the fact that it had been 
launched on a unilateral basis without any hearing to appreciate the 
adversarial aspect of the process.68  Besides, it argued that there was a new 
Italian law changing the legal context of the case, although the CJEU 
considered it irrelevant by noting that the case was brought by a court or 
tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU.69 
 
The judgment clarified that the inter partes condition stipulated in Vaassen 
Göbbels is not a decisive factor to consider a body a court or tribunal under 
article 267 TFEU.70 This ruling made it clear that the CJEU only needs to 
confirm that the tribunal launching the procedure exercises a judicial 
function and that an interpretation on EU law is needed for the national 
proceedings.71Thus, even if the procedure of the body in question did not 
involve a proper hearing, the reference to the CJEU could still be allowed 
as long as it was performing a judicial function and considered that an 
interpretation on EU law was needed.72 The same position was maintained 
by the CJEU in Birra Deher.73 
 
Even though in Simmenthal74 and Ligur Carni75 the CJEU stressed that the 
preliminary ruling should be requested only if there is an adversarial 
process, the truth is that the CJEU did not reject its previous argument.76 
For example, in Pretore di Cento77 and Pretura Unificata di Torino,78 the CJEU 
approved without any doubt the admissibility of references in cases 
without parties. Therefore, this particular requirement has lost ground.79  
 
3. Independence and Impartiality as Essential Characteristics: the Corbiau Case 
The judgment in Politi raised another concern related to the judicial 
function exercised by a court or tribunal. Could any court exercising such a 
judicial function make a request for a preliminary ruling before the CJEU 
at any time? The question was answered in the Corbiau case.80 Since Vasen 
Göbbels, the CJEU has checked that the requirements laid out in that 
                                                
68 ibid,  1044.  
69 ibid. 
70 Maldoon (n 42)  23.  
71 C-43/71 Politi [1971] ECR 1039, para 5 .  
72 ibid, para 5; Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 
De Coster [2001] ECR I-9445, para 30.  
73 C-162/73 Birra Dreher v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1974] ECR 201. 
74 C-70/77 Simmenthal v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1978] ECR 1453. 
75 Joined Cases C-277/91, C-318/91 and C-319/91 Ligur Carni Srl and Genova Carni Srl v 
Unità Sanitaria Locale n. XV di Genova and Ponente SpA v Unità Sanitaria Locale n. XIX 
di La Spezia and CO.GE.SE.MA Coop a r l. [1993] ECR I-6621. 
76See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster 
[2001] ECR I-9445, para 31. 
77 C-110/76 Pretore di Cento [1977] ECR 851. 
78 C-228/87 Pretura unificata di Torino [1988] ECR 5099. 
79 Maldoon (n 42)  23. 
80 C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277. 
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ruling are complied with. However, some other requirements have 
appeared in subsequent judgments. That was the case with the 
requirement of independence, firstly mentioned in Pretore di Salo,81 but 
later further considered in Corbiau. In fact, it could be argued that Corbiau 
gave fundamental meaning to the criterion of independence82.  
 
In Corbiau, the Director of Taxation and Excise Duties Directorate of 
Luxembourg83 made a request for a preliminary ruling with the aim of 
interpreting the former article 48 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (EEC Treaty).84 According to former article 48 
EEC Treaty (current article 45 TFEU), the freedom of movement of 
workers ‘shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.'85 
 
Mr Corbiau had made an application to the Directeur des Contributions of 
Luxembourg under article 131 of the Luxembourgish Tax Code.86 He relied 
on the judgment of the CJEU in Biehl.87 In that case, the CJEU had ruled 
that article 48(2) of the EEC Treaty: 
 
precludes a Member State from providing in its tax 
legislation that sums deducted by way of tax from the 
salaries and wages of employed persons who are nationals 
of a Member State and are resident taxpayers for only part 
of the year because they take up residence in the country 
or leave it during the course of the tax year are to remain 
the property of the Treasury and are not repayable.88  
 
Mr Corbiau had been working at the Paribas Bank in Luxembourg.89 He 
lived in Luxembourg until 25 October 1990, when he transferred his 
residence to Belgium while remaining employed in Luxembourg.90 From 1 
January 1990 to 25October 1990, the employer of Mr Corbiau had 
deducted income tax from his salary at the rate applicable to a taxpayer 
resident in Luxembourg.91  The refund of overpaid tax was denied under 
                                                
81 Case C-14/86 Pretore di Salò v Persons [1987] ECR 2545. 
82 Maldoon (n 42) p 18.  
83 This is the current Administration des contributions directes of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, which is a tax service whose main tasks aim to set and cover direct 
taxes, to establish the basis on which the property tax will be charged and finally, to 
set and collect taxes. See http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/, (accessed  11 January 
2014). 
84 C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277, para 1.  
85 Art 48(2) EEC Treaty.  
86 C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277, para 7.  
87 Case C-175/88 Biehl vs Administration des Contributions [1990] ECR I-1779. 
88ibid, para 19.  
89 C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277, para 3. 
90 ibid.  
91 ibid, para 4.  




Article 154 of the Luxemburgish Income Tax Law that established that 
those excesses would benefit the Treasury.92 
 
Thus, the Director of Taxation and Excise Duties Directorate decided to 
request from the CJEU a preliminary ruling to interpret Article 48 of the 
EEC Treaty in order to clarify his doubts regarding the application of the 
judgment in Biehl.93 In this case, the CJEU wanted to determine whether 
the Director of Taxation and Excise Duties Directorate could be 
considered a tribunal or court for the purpose of the preliminary ruling.94 
That was a key point for the case, since the CJEU would admit the 
question or not depending on the answer. 
 
The first problem arose due to the fact that the State Council of 
Luxembourg had recognised its status as a court in some contentious and 
non-contentious matters.95 Nevertheless, Advocate-General Darmon 
issued an opinion arguing that the concept of a court or tribunal was 
autonomous and it has been defined by the case law of the CJEU.96 Thus, 
the Advocate General claimed that the recognition by the State Council of 
Luxembourg was not enough to confer the status of a court or tribunal to 
the Director of Taxation and Excise Duties Directorate.97  
 
Eventually, the CJEU did not admit the reference.98 However, it did so not 
on the grounds provided by the Advocate General, but by considering that 
the expression 'court or tribunal' is ‘a concept of Community law, which 
can only mean an authority acting as a third party in relation to the 
authority which adopted the decision forming the subject matter of the 
proceedings.'99 In this sense, the CJEU could not consider the Director of 
Taxation and Excise Duties Directorate as a third party because he was the 
head of the Taxation and Excise Duties Directorate.100 Taking this fact 
into account, he could not be regarded as being impartial in relation to this 
authority, having been the head of the very authority that had made the 
appealed decision.101 Therefore, the CJEU concluded that the Director of 
Taxation and Excise Duties Directorate was not a court or tribunal for the 
purposes of the reference for a preliminary ruling.102 
                                                
92 ibid, paras 5-6.  
93 C-175/88 Biehl vs Administration des Contributions [1990] ECR I-1779. 
94 C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277, para 14.  
95 As pointed out in the opinion of Advocate General Darmon in C-24/92 Corbiau 
[1993] ECR I-0000, that recognition was given in Caisse hypothécaire du Luxembourg 
No 5833 on the Court Roll and in Toussaint v Administration des contributions, No 5516 
on the Court Roll. 
96 ibid, para 4.  
97 ibid. 
98 C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277, para 17.  
99 ibid, para 15.  
100 ibid, para 16. 
101 ibid.  
102 ibid, para 17.  
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From this judgment, it can be deduced that impartiality and independence 
are two essential characteristics to consider a body a court or tribunal 
under article 267 TFEU. Hence, in order to be recognised as competent to 
make a reference for a preliminary ruling, courts and tribunals must act as 
third parties in the original litigation process. The the Corbiau judgment 
was later confirmed in X,103 a case in which the CJEU did not admit a 
request for a preliminary ruling because the petitioner did not fulfil the 
requirement of independence.104 Nevertheless, the CJEU has departed 
from  the consideration of that requirement and this has led to criticism.105 
In a series of cases - starting with Dorsch Consult106  the Court referred to 
the exercise of the function in an independent way and under own 
responsibility.107 This has been later confirmed in Köllensperger and 
Atzwanger.108 
 
IV. PROBLEMATIC CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF A 
COURT OR TRIBUNAL 
 
Now that the characteristics for being considered a court or tribunal have 
been laid out, it is time to assess this concept with some examples of 
bodies or authorities that the CJEU has considered to fall within or 
outside article 267 TFEU. The following section will outline some case law 
in which the CJEU used functional criteria to examine whether several 
types of different courts, authorities and bodies could be considered a 
court or  tribunal for the purposes of a preliminary ruling procedure.   
 
It should be highlighted that the selected cases deal with references for 
preliminary rulings requested by bodies which do not carry out a pure 
judicial function or which do not even exercise it within their legal 
systems. The cases have been selected to show the CJEU’s wide range of 
interpretations of the criteria, sometimes leading to the admission of 
references that are not made by judges. This is done on a case-by-case basis 
because the nature and functions of  bodies may vary between countries, 
which makes CJEU’s task more difficult. Admission of references from 
non-judicial bodies creates controversy and also legal uncertainty for 
bodies that would like to question the Court on the interpretation or 
validity of European law. 
 
1. Can Arbitration Courts be Competent for the Preliminary Ruling? The Nordsee 
Case 
                                                
103 Joined cases C-74/95 and C-129/95  X  [1996] ECR I-6609.  
104 See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster 
[2001] ECR I-9445, para 20. 
105ibid,  19-28; Maldoon (n 42),  22.  
106 C-54/96 Dorsch Consult v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin [1987] ECR 2545. 
107 See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster 
[2001] ECR I-9445, para 21. 
108 C-103/97 Köllensperger and Atzwanger [1999] ECR I-551. 




The judgment in Corbiau109could have brought with it a question of 
arbitration bodies as courts or tribunals entitled to launch the reference 
for a preliminary ruling. Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism where parties decide to submit their dispute to a third person 
(“arbitrator”) who will make a legally-binding decision or otherwise as if 
s/he was a judge. Since it has rapidly evolved as a method of resolving 
international trade disputes where EU law must be taken into 
consideration, arbitration has also increased the significance of referring 
questions to the CJEU about the application and interpretation of EU 
law.110 Besides, Vassen Göbbels111 recognised a Dutch arbitration court as a 
court or tribunal for the purposes of article 267 TFEU. Some authors 
considered that Vassen Göbbels had indicated that the CJEU would later 
admit references from private arbitration tribunals.112 Moreover, the CJEU 
had strengthened the condition of third party impartiality for courts and 
tribunals  wishing to make a request for a preliminary ruling in Corbiau.113 
Then, could arbitration courts and tribunals be considered a court or 
tribunal for the purposes of the reference for a preliminary ruling? The 
answer came in Nordsee,114 where the CJEU ruled that arbitration courts are 
not courts or tribunals.  
 
In Nordsee, a dispute submitted for arbitration arose from a contract signed 
by German shipbuilders .115 The arbitrator used the reference for a 
preliminary ruling procedure to ask for an interpretation of a series of 
three Regulations concerning aid from the Guidance Section of the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.116 In this case, the 
CJEU had first to consider whether the arbitration tribunal was a court or 
tribunal for the purposes of the procedure. In order to solve this issue, the 
CJEU analysed the nature of the arbitration tribunal in question. 
 
The CJEU perceived certain similarities between the activities of the 
arbitration tribunal in question and an ordinary court or tribunal.117 This 
was mainly because the arbitrator had to decide according to law and his 
decision had the force of res judicata between the parties and had to be 
                                                
109 C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277. 
110 Joseph H H Weiler and Martina Kocjan, 'The law of the European Union. 
Teaching material. The Community System of judicial remedies: jurisdiction 
examined: article 234' NYU School of Law 2004/05,  11.  
111C-61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels [1966] ECR 377. 
112 W Paul Gormley, 'The Future Role of Arbitration within the EEC: The Right of 
an Arbitrator to Request a Preliminary Ruling Pursuant to Article 177' (1968) 12St. 
Louis University Law Journal 550-563.  
113 C-24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277. 
114 C-102/81 Nordsee v Reederei Mond [1982] ECR I-1095. For an analysis of the case see 
Broberg and Fenger (n 38), 84-86; and Storm (n 43)  150.   
115ibid, para 2.  
116 Regulation No 17/64/EEC of the Council of 5 February [1964] OJ No 34/586, 
Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of the Council of 21 April [1970] OJ No L 94/13 and 
Regulation (EEC) No 2722/72 of the Council of 19 December [1972] OJ L 291/30. 
117 C-102/81 Nordsee [1982] ECR I-1095, para 10. 
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enforceable.118 Nevertheless, the CJEU considered that those 
characteristics were not enough to make an arbitration court become a 
court or tribunal in the sense of article 267 TFEU.119  
 
In contrast to Vassen-Göbbels, the CJEU pointed out that the parties were 
not obliged to refer their dispute to arbitration.120  In fact, it was 
underlined that, when signing the contract ‘the parties were free to leave 
their disputes to be resolved by ordinary courts or to opt for arbitration by 
inserting a clause to that effect in the contract.'121 Furthermore, the CJEU 
stated that the German public authorities were neither involved in the 
decision to refer the matter to arbitration nor requested to intervene in 
the arbitral proceedings.122 On top of that, the CJEU stressed that the 
arbitral tribunal lacked the public character criteria laid out in Vaassen-
Göbbels since it ‘was established pursuant to a contract between private 
individuals.'123 It also stated that the German State was responsible ‘for the 
performance of obligations arising from'124 EU law within its territory and 
it had ‘not entrusted or left to private individuals the duty of ensuring'125 
the compliance of the obligations in this particular case.  
 
Thus, the CJEU refused to consider it as a court or tribunal and it did not 
accept the reference.126 Nevertheless, the judgment did not exclude the 
possibility of accepting questions raised in an arbitration process through 
national courts or tribunals which examine them in a context of a 
collaboration or in the course of a review of an arbitration award.127 In any 
case, it is up to the national court or tribunal to consider making a 
reference since they are courts or tribunals under article 267 TFEU.128  
 
The CJEU has followed the Nordsee judgment.129 It has made it clear that a 
conventional arbitration court cannot make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling.130 The reason isthat arbitral tribunals lack compulsory jurisdiction,131 
                                                
118 ibid.   
119ibid, para 13. 
120 ibid, para 11. 
121 ibid.  
122 ibid, para 12. 
123 ibid, para 7. 
124 ibid, para 12. 
125 ibid. 
126 ibid, paras 13 and 16. 
127 ibid, para 14. 
128 ibid, para 15.  
129 C-125/04 Guy Denuit and Betty Cordenier. v. Transorient – Mosaïque Voyages et Culture 
SA [2005] ECR I-923, para 13. 
130 The CJEU has recently confirmed it in C-555/13 Merck Canada Inc v Accord 
Healthcare Ltd, Alter SA, Labochem Ltd,  Synthon BV, Ranbaxy Portugal - Comércio e 
Desenvolvimiento de Produtos Farmacêuticos, Unipessoal Lda [2014] (not pubished yet), 
paras 16-17. By analogy, the same could be said for mediation; the author was 
expecting an opinion of the CJEU in C-492/11 Ciro Di Donna v Società imballaggi 




which is one of criteria established in Vaassen Göbbels. There are scholars 
who have a different opinion and consider that arbitral courts should be 
able to refer questions to the CJEU.132 Despite the fact that there might be 
arguments for reconsidering the situation,133 the case law of CJEU 
concerning preliminary rulings and arbitration courts is very consistent.  
 
However, it has also been clarified that there are situations where 
arbitration courts can be considered as having jurisdiction entitling them 
to make use of the reference for a preliminary ruling procedure. For 
example, that was the case in Danfoos134 whereby: 
 
the reference for a preliminary ruling was made by a 
Danish arbitration court granted final jurisdiction by law 
in disputes relating to collective agreements between 
employees' organisations and employers, where the 
jurisdiction did not depend on the agreement between the 
parties since either might bring a case before it despite the 
objections of the other, and the decision was binding on 
everybody.135  
 
This has been confirmed very recently in Merck Canada Inc.136 Therefore, 
the CJEU admits questions from an arbitral court with a legal origin, 
whose award is binding for the parties and whose jurisdiction does not 
depend upon the parties’ agreement.137 Furthermore, in Almelo138 the CJEU 
has also ‘accepted jurisdiction to reply to the questions referred for a 
preliminary ruling by a judicial body determining, according to what 
appeared fair and reasonable, an appeal from an arbitration award, because 
it was required to observe the rules of Community Law.'139  
 
                                                                                                                                 
metallici Salerno srl (SIMSA) [2013] ECR I-00000 but, due to the derogation of the 
legislation applicable to the dispute, it did not give a ruling.  
131 Maldoon (n 42)  24; Van Raepenbusch (n 18) 549, and; Broberg and Fenger (n 38)  
84-85. 
132Xavier de Mello, 'Arbitrage et droit communautaire'(1982) Revue de l'arbitrage 395; 
Van Raepenbusch (n 18)  549, fn 67.  
133 Terkildsen and Lysholm argued that arbitral courts should be considered court or 
tribunal under article 267 TFEU: Dan Terkildsen and Sebastian Lysholm Nielsen, 
'Arbitral Tribunals and Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union – The Danish By-Pass Rule' (2012)Austrian Yearbook on International 
Arbitration   195-206.  
134 C-109/88 Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, paras 7-9. 
135See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster 
[2001] ECR I-9445, para 50. 
136 C- 555/13 Merck Canada Inc, not published yet. 
137 C-109/88 Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, para 7; C- 555/13 Merck Canada Inc, not 
published yet, para 18. 
138 C-393/92 Almelo and Others [1994] ECR 1-1477. 
139 See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster 
[2001] ECR I-9445, para51. 
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2. Can Economic and Administrative Courts be Competent for the Preliminary 
Ruling? The Gabalfrisa Case 
The Gabalfrisa case140 dealt with the consideration of economic and 
administrative courts as courts or tribunals entitled to raise questions to 
the CJEU. Previously, the CJEU had already admitted a reference from the 
Spanish economic and administrative court in the Iberlacta case.141 The 
Gabalfrisa case involved a determination whether a Spanish regional 
economic and administrative court (Catalonia) would fall under article 267 
TFEU. In Spain, these courts are not judicial, but administrative in 
nature.142 Despite preceding the Gabalfrisa case, the ruling in the Iberlacta 
case didnot set any precedent for Gabalfrisa since it did not argue how 
economic and administrative courts could meet the criteria to be 
considered a court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU.143 Thus, it wass in 
the Gabalfrisa case that such an examination took place.144 In this case, 
there was an important division of opinions between the Advocate General 
and the CJEU.145 The former claimed that it was an administrative court 
that not entitled to refer questions, whereas the latter decided that it fell 
under article 267 TFEU.  
 
In the original proceedings, various departments of the Spanish Tax 
Agency had refused several entrepreneurs and professional practitioners 
the deduction of value added tax (VAT) paid in respect of transactions 
carried out prior to the commencement of their activity.146 The Spanish 
Tax Agency argued that it was done on the grounds of infringement of the 
requirements laid down in national law, more specifically Article 111 of Law 
No 37/1992 and Article 28 of Royal Decree No 1624/1992.147  
 
However, those entrepreneurs and professional practitioners considered 
that Article 111 of Law No 37/1992 was contrary to Article 17(1) and (2)(a) of 
                                                
140 Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577. 
141 Joined Cases C-260/91 and C-261/91 Diversinte SA and Iberlacta SA v Administración 
Principal de Aduanas de la Junquera [1993] ECR I-1885.  
142 Pilar Charro Baena and Carolina San Martín Mazzucconi, 'Derechos sociales y 
tutela judicial efectiva en la Constitución Europea' (2005) Revista del Ministerio de 
Trabajo e Inmigración nº 57,  57.  
143 Francisco M. Carrasco González, El planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales al TJCE 
por los Tribunales Económico-Administrativos. Necesidad de un nuevo examen. Ministerio de 
Hacienda: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (2009), 99.  
144 ibid.  
145Some authors maintain that Advocate General Saggio was very belligerent against 
considering this court to fall under article 267 TFEU. See: Clemente Checa 
González, 'Crítica del carácter obligatorio de la vía económico-administrativa en la 
nueva ley general tributaria española'(2004) 16(1) Revista de Derecho [2004] 154.  
146 Joined Cases C-110/98  to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577, para 
10.  
147 ibid. 




the Sixth VAT Directive.148 Thus, they appealed the decision of the 
Spanish Tax Agency before the Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional 
de Cataluña, which is the regional economic and administrative court of 
Catalonia. That court had doubts about the compatibility of Law No 
37/1992 with Article 17 of the Sixth Directive and referred a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU.149  
 
Advocate-General Saggio considered that the regional economic and 
administrative court of Catalonia did not meet the criteria to fall under 
what is currently article 267 TFEU.150 He insisted on the lack of 
independence of this court. He also rejected an argument that not 
admitting references from economic and administrative courts would put 
the uniform application of EU law at stake because those courts issue 
resolutions which can be subject to judicial review.151 Thus, the Catalonian 
economic and administrative court should not be empowered to refer a 
preliminary ruling. Nevertheless, the CJEU did not follow the Advocate-
General’s opinion and considered that the court met the criteria developed 
by EU case law in order to qualify as a court or tribunal competent to 
request preliminary rulings.152. 
 
The CJEU considered that the economic and administrative courts were 
of statutory origin and permanent since their tasks were defined and their 
procedure for fiscal complaints was organised by Spanish legislation.153 It 
also acknowledged that the jurisdiction of those tribunals was compulsory 
since national legislation provided that they were able to rule on 
complaints in order to challenge decisions of the Spanish Tax Authority.154 
                                                
148Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value-added tax: 
uniform basis of assessment OJ L 145/1. 
149 Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa [2000] ECR I-1577, para 13.  
150 Opinion of Advocate General Saggio in Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 
Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-01577.  
151 Francisco M Carrasco González, 'El planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales al 
TJCE por los Tribunales Económico-Administrativos. Necesidad de un nuevo 
examen' (2009) Ministerio de Hacienda: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales  100.  
152 Case Vaasen Göbbels [1966] ECR 377; Case Pretore di Salò v Persons [1987] ECR 2545; 
Case Dorsch Consult [1987] ECR 2545, para 7; Case Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, paras 7-8; 
Case Almelo and Others [1994] ECR 1-1477 .  
153 Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa [2000] ECR I-1577, para 34. The 
tasks were defined by Law No 230/1963 and Legislative Decree No 2795/1980 whereas 
the procedure for fiscal complaints was organised by Royal Decree No 391/1996, Law 
No 230/1963, Legislative Decree No 2795/1980 and Royal Decree No 391/1996.  
154 In accordance with Article 35(1) of Legislative Decree No 2795/1980, Article 163 of 
Law No 230/1963, Article 40 of Legislative Decree No 2795/1980, and Articles 4(2) 
and 119(3) and (4) of Royal Decree No 391/1996. C-147/98 Gabalfrisa [2000] ECR I-
1577, para 35. 
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According to national rules, the final decisions of the tribunals were also 
binding.155 
 
Concerning the inter-partes nature of the procedure, the CJEU clarified 
that this was not an absolute criterion as it was laid out in previous case 
law156 and the Spanish legislation157 allowed the parties concerned to lodge 
submissions and evidence in support of their claims and request a public 
hearing.158 For the CJEU, the economic-administrative tribunals may also 
apply rules of law since the relevant provisions in the Spanish legislation159 
establish that they are competent to give reasons in fact and in law for 
their decisions and it is in these tribunals’ power to rule on fiscal 
complaints.160 Unlike in Corbiau,161 the CJEU also held that the economic-
administrative tribunals did indeed meet the criteria of independence. As 
such, they were a clear third party in the process since national laws 
established and ensured a clear separation of functions between the 
departments of the tax authority responsible for management, clearance 
and recovery and the economic-administrative courts which independently 
deal with complaints against decisions of the tax authority’s department.162 
 
The CJEU’s judgment in Gabalfrisa has been very much criticised. In his 
conclusions for De Coster,163 Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer raised 
some concerns about that ruling. Ruiz-Jarabo called into question the 
impartiality and independence of the members of the economic and 
administrative court because they are officials of the public administration 
and are appointed by a minister who can dismiss them whenever he or she 
wants to do so.164 Moreover, the Advocate-General stressed the fact that 
complaints before those courts are just administrative appeals.165 
 
The Advocate-General also pointed out that economic and administrative 
courts must reply within a year following the appeal; otherwise that appeal 
is rejected and the complaint may go for contentious administrative 
proceedings.166 In order to strengthen his arguments, he also mentioned 
that the economic and administrative courts may inhibit themselves in 
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those cases considered important or whose amount is remarkably high and 
leave the decision for the Ministry of Finance.167 For Ruiz-Jarabo, the 
Gabalfrisa case showed confusion between administrative and judicial 
bodies.  
 
Besides, Ruiz-Jarabo argued that these courts do not follow an entirely 
adversarial process since the pleas and evidence admitted have a limited 
character and the public hearing is settled discretionarily by the body itself 
without any possibility of appeal.168 The Advocate General also highlighted 
that administrative structures which decide under legal criteria do not 
need to be composed of jurists.169 To support his position, he pointed out 
some cases where preliminary rulings were accepted despite the fact that 
their members were not jurists.170 
 
The Advocate-General claimed that the admission of ‘references for 
preliminary rulings from administrative bodies seriously hinders the 
dialogue between courts established by the Treaty, distorts its aims and 
undermines the judicial protection of the citizen.'171 Even though the 
CJEU considered the Catalonian economic and administrative courts as 
competent to request a preliminary ruling, many scholars do not agree with 
this condition.172 In this sense, the ruling in Gabalfrisa has been considered 
'a gradual relaxation of the requirement that the body should be 
independent.'173However, some Spanish scholars have argued over time 
that economic and administrative courts would be competent to refer 
questions to the CJEU.174This lack of unanimity is a problem when 
determining who can make use of the reference for a preliminary ruling. 
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3.Can Competition Authorities be Competent for the Preliminary Ruling? The 
Syfait Case 
As courts which do not exercise a pure juridical function have been 
considered as falling under article 267 TFEU by the CJEU, it leaves open 
the possibility of accepting other bodies which make decisions with legal 
implications, but whose function is not entirely juridical. That is the case 
for competition authorities. National competition authorities are bodies 
which have a regulatory mandate over competition issues covering all 
sectors of the economy in their country.175 As such, they make decisions 
and sanction market actors that infringe on competition rules.176 The 
CJEU had already considered that the former Spanish Competition 
Authority was allowed to request preliminary rulings.177 The Syfait case 
again raised the question about whether national competition authorities 
could be considered a court or tribunal in the sense of article 267 TFEU.178 
The ruling in this case was largely awaited due to reasons which had to do 
with competition law.179 Nevertheless, the CJEU rejected the positive 
opinion of the Advocate General and did not admit the reference for a 
preliminary ruling. Thus, those expectations were never satisfied.  
 
In this case there was a conflict between GSK plc and its Greek subsidiary 
GSK AEVE - a company distributing medicinal products  - and several of 
its clients (Syfait and others, PSF, Interfarm and Others, and 
Marinopoulos and Others); all of them were wholesalers or represented 
associations of wholesalers to whom GSK AEVE had refused to supply 
three pharmaceutical products (Imigran, Lamictal and Serevent) on the 
Greek market in order to avoid parallel imports.180 GSK AEVE based its 
decision to change its distribution system supplying directly to hospitals 
and pharmacies on a serious economic situation.181 
 
The wholesalers reported to the Greek competition authority (Epitropi 
Antagonismou) alleging the non-attention of the orders that had been 
requested of GSK AEVE, claiming that this attitude could constitute an 
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abuse of dominant position within the meaning of Article 2 of Greek Law 
No 703/1977 and article 102 TFEU (former art 82 TEC).182 On 3 August 
2001, the Greek competition authority requested that GSK AEVE 
temporarily comply with the orders.183 The competition authority 
compelled both GSK plc and GSK AEVE to comply with a circular 
adopted on 27 November 2001 by the Greek Organisation for Medicines, 
which provided that all participants in the distribution of prescribed 
medicines ‘must supply to the domestic market quantities at least equal to 
current prescription levels … plus an amount (25%) to cover any 
emergencies and changes of circumstance.’184  
 
Then, GSK AEVE appealed to the Administrative Appeal Court in Athens 
– which confirmed that measure – and afterwards it applied to the Greek 
competition authority for negative clearance under Article 11 of Law No 
703/1977 in respect of its refusal to cover more than 125% of Greek 
demand.185 The Greek competition authority decided to make a reference 
to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling in order to know to what extent the 
refusal by GSK plc and GKS AEVE to fully meet the orders placed by the 
complainants constituted an abuse of a dominant position within the 
meaning of article 102 TFEU. 
 
Advocate General Jacobs considered that there were no grounds for 
refusing the condition of a court or tribunal to the Greek competition 
authority.186 He argued that the authority met the criteria needed to be 
considered a court or tribunal.187 However, the CJEU did not follow his 
opinion. In fact, it stressed the fact that the competition authority was not 
a court or tribunal since it did not meet the conditions established by EU 
case law in order to be considered so.188 Thus, the CJEU had no 
jurisdiction to answer the questions.189 
 
The CJEU stressed the facts that the Greek competition authority was 
supervised by the Greek Minister for Development;190 its personnel were 
not free from removal;191 its president was responsible for the coordination 
and general policy of the secretariat, which investigates and proposes the 
decisions later adopted by the authority, and; he was the immediate 
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superior of the secretariat’s personnel.192 Consequently, the CJEU 
considered that the Greek competition authority did not meet the criteria 
of independence since it was not a clear third party ‘in relation to the State 
body which, by virtue of its role, may be akin to a party in the course of 
competition proceedings.'193   
 
Finally, the CJEU highlighted that national competition authorities have 
to cooperate with the European Commission and consequently, may be 
relieved from their competences to apply articles 101 and 102 TFEU by a 
Commission’s decision.194 The CJEU also held that, according to the 
relevant case law,195 a body having a pending case which requires giving a 
judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature 
may refer a question.196 However, if the Commission can relieve the 
national authority from its competence, then any proceedings initiated 
before that authority will not lead to a decision of a judicial nature.197 This 
judgment tightens up the requirements to use the preliminary ruling198 and 
it could be inferred from it that no national competition authority may be 
considered a court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU.  
 
On this point, it could be argued that there are advantages and 
disadvantages of considering competition authorities courts or tribunals 
under article 267 TFEU.199 These authorities exist in each Member State 
and they apply articles 101 and 102 TFEU in their territories. Those 
provisions are anything but easy to apply and concern many actors on the 
market. On top of that, each national competition authority has a 
different experience when using those provisions. As a result, there may be 
a risk to uniform application of the competition provisions which could be 
remedied by allowing national competition authorities to refer questions 
to the CJEU. That being said, this could increase the workload of the 
CJEU if it had to admit references from 28 national competition 
authorities. This could in turn result in delays for justice as the CJEU 
rulings take a significant amount of time. Competition authorities should 
wait for the CJEU to rule before issuing their decision, which is subject to 
judicial review and could later lead to another reference for a preliminary 
ruling.  
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Nevertheless, it is clear that this judgment is  a reaction of the CJEU to 
criticism from scholars and Advocates General against previous and soft 
case law.200 This argument is supported by the fact that the criterion of 
independence, as explained in the judgment, becomes more difficult to 
liberally apply as in the past.201 It seems that the conclusions of Ruiz 
Jarabo in De Coster have made the CJEU analyse the criteria more severely, 
especially the condition of independence.202  
 
4. Can Administrative Bodies be Competent for the Preliminary Ruling? The Belov 
Case 
In Belov203 the CJEU examined whether certain administrative bodies or 
agencies with quasi-judicial functions could be considered a court or 
tribunal for the purposes of article 267 TFEU. In this case, Valeri Hariev 
Belov had made a complaint to a Commission of protection against 
discrimination created under Bulgarian law (Komisia za zashtita ot 
diskriminatsia, KZD).204 The reason the complaint was that Chez Elektro 
Balgaria (CEB) had placed meters to measure electricity consumption at a 
height of seven meters on posts in two areas of the city of Montana 
(Bulgaria) mainly inhabited by the Roma community.205 The KZD 
considered that the measure constituted indirect discrimination on 
grounds of ethnicity within the meaning of Articles 4.3 and 37 of the 
Bulgarian Law on protection against discrimination.206 This law had been 
adopted in order to transpose Directive 2000/43/EC, which implements 
the principle of equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
Consequently, the KZD thought that an interpretation of EU Law was 
necessary before deciding on the claim.207 For that reason, the KZD 
referred several questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.208 It is 
interesting to note that not only KZD itself but also the Bulgarian 
Government and the European Commission were convinced that it was a 
court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU.209 However, that is irrelevant 
since it was up to the CJEU to determine if it is a body entitled to make 
use of the procedure.210  
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In the analysis of KZD, the CJEU insisted on the fact that 'a national body 
may be classified as a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 
TFEU, when it is performing judicial functions, but when exercising other 
functions, of an administrative nature, for example, it cannot be recognised 
as such.'211 By giving several reasons, it concluded that KZD was similar in 
substance to a national administrative body which makes administrative 
decisions. The CJEU explained that there were four factors which made it 
believe that the procedure before the KZD was going to lead to a decision 
of an administrative nature.212 
 
First of all, the CJEU considered that KZD may bring similar proceedings 
by way of application, complaint or even of its own motion whose results 
are very much the same.213 In the second place, the CJEU realized that the 
KZD may join persons other than those appointed by the party to the 
proceedings of its own motion when it considers it necessary.214 Thirdly, in 
case of an action brought against a KZD decision, the CJEU explained 
that this body has the status of defendant before the competent 
administrative court. Furthermore, if that decision is annulled, KZD may 
appeal before the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria.215 As a fourth 
factor, the CJEU found that KZD may revoke any action brought against 
its decision if the party to whom the decision is addressed is favorable.216 
All these factors made the CJEU decide that KZD has no jurisdictional 
function and it would not fall under the concept of a court or tribunal in 
article 267 TFEU. However, the assessment by the CJEU was exclusive to 
KZD and should not be extended to other administrative bodies, which 
will require separate specific analysis in order to consider them as a court 
or tribunal under article 267 TFEU.  
 
5. Can Courts of Audit be Competent for the Preliminary Ruling? The Elegktiko 
Synedriou Case 
The Elegktikou Sinedriou case217 dealt with the consideration of a court of 
auditors as competent to refer questions to the CJEU. In some Member 
States, like Portugal, the Court of Auditors is considered to be a true 
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financial court by the Constitution of the country.218 In this country, it is a 
sovereign, independent and constitutional body which is not included in 
the public administration.219 In Spain, the Court of Auditors is said to have 
fiscal and judicial functions. The judicial function would consist of 
prosecuting the accounting liability incurred by those who are responsible 
for managing assets, public funds or effects.220 Thus, the Elegktikou 
Sinedriou case was a good opportunity to assess the judicial functions of 
those courts for the purposes of the reference for a preliminary ruling 
procedure.  
 
In this case, the Greek Court of Auditors (Elegktikou Sinedriou) made a 
reference to the CJEU in the context of a dispute between Epitropos tou 
Elegktikou Sinedriou sto Ipourgio Politismou kai Tourismou (the Commissioner 
of the Court of Auditors at the Ministry of Culture and Tourism) and 
Ipourgio Politismou kai Tourismou - Ipiresia Dimosionomikou Elenchou (The 
Audit Service of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism). This dispute 
concerned the cCommissioner‘s refusal to approve the payment order 
issued by the audit service relating to the remuneration of a member of the 
staff of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, who was employed on a 
private law fixed-term contract.221  
 
The Commissioner had refused the approval by stating that workers 
employed by the state on private law fixed-term employment contracts are 
entitled to unpaid leave for trade union business, while the same workers 
with contracts of indefinite duration are entitled to paid leave for trade 
union business.222 The Audit Service resubmitted the payment order for 
the Commissioner's approval. His refusal and the matter were brought 
before the first section of the Greek Court of Auditors, which decided to 
halt proceedings and to refer some preliminary questions to the CJEU.223  
 
Before answering, the CJEU had to determine whether it constituted a 
court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU and whether it 
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was entitled to make use of the reference for a preliminary ruling.224 
Firstly, it analysed whether the Court of Auditors met the criteria of 
independence established by previous case law.225 In this case, the CJEU 
found that the Commissioner was a member of the Court of Auditors, who 
is attached to each Ministry to carry out a priori auditing of orders for 
expenditure made by the Ministry concerned.226 Therefore, the CJEU 
argued that there was a clear organisational and functional link between 
the Court of Auditors and the Commissioner attached to the Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism.227 Thus, the CJEU explained that it was impossible 
to consider the Greek Court of Auditors as a third party in relation to the 
Commissioner.228  
 
Furthermore, the CJEU claimed that the decision of the Court of Auditors 
was not part of proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial 
nature.229 That lack of res judicata force made it impossible for this body to 
qualify as a court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU.230 Even though it 
combined a judicial function with other ones, the CJEU has jurisdiction 
only to answer those preliminary rulings requests which are referred on the 
basis of the judicial function.231 It is clear that in this case, the Greek Court 
of Auditors was not exercising a judicial function. Consequently, it would 
not meet another requirement to be considered a court or tribunal within 
the meaning of Article 267 TFEU. On top of that, the CJEU stated that 
the beneficiary of the expenditure in question in the main proceedings was 
not a party to the proceedings before the Court of Auditors.232 That 
beneficiary would only be a party in proceedings brought afterwards before 
an administrative court deciding on the issue of remuneration.233 It would 
be up to that administrative court to decide to make use of the reference 
for a preliminary ruling.234 Considering all of these facts, the CJEU did not 
find that the Greek Court of Auditors was acting in a judicial capacity and 
it did not admit the reference for a preliminary ruling.235  
 
That being said, the CJEU should assess whether other courts of auditors 
from different Member States might be considered courts or tribunals for 
the purposes of a reference for a preliminary ruling. This is because the 
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analysis of this case only focused on the specific features of the Greek 
Court of Auditors. In spite of such specific analysis of the Greek Court of 
Auditors, the judgment helps to conclude that bodies combining judicial 
and other functions may fall under article 267 TFEU, provided that they 
refer the question on the basis of their judicial functions and they fulfill  
other criteria. 
 
6. Can a Professional Body be Competent for the Preliminary Ruling? The De 
Coster Case 
The De Coster case236 examined whether a professional body which has 
been tasked to implement legal provisions could be considered a court or 
tribunal for the purposes of article 267 TFEU. In this case, there was a 
dispute between Mr De Coster and Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de 
Watermael-Boitsfort in Belgium because the Collège levied a municipal tax on 
Mr De Coster’s satellite dishes.237 He lodged an appeal before the Collège 
jurisdictionnel de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale (Judicial Board of the 
Brussels-capital region) on the grounds of a restriction of free movement 
of services (more specifically, a restriction on the freedom to receive 
television programmes from other Member States).238 The Judicial Board 
of the Brussels-capital region decided to launch the reference for a 
preliminary ruling before the CJEU.239  
 
By analysing national legislation, the CJEU found that the Judicial Board 
of the Brussels-capital region exercised similar judicial functions to the 
permanent deputation in the rest of the provinces of Belgium.240 On top of 
that, it discovered that the members of the Board had the same rules on 
ineligibility as the members of the permanent deputations in provinces and 
that the same rules must be respected in proceedings before them when 
exercising judicial functions.241 Because of that, the CJEU concluded that 
the Board was 'a permanent body, established by law, that it gives legal 
rulings and that the jurisdiction thereby invested in it concerning local tax 
proceedings is compulsory.'242  
 
Despite the fact that the CJEU had doubts about the criteria of inter partes 
procedure, independence and impartiality, it finally concluded that the 
Board met them. The CJEU found several elements that made it consider 
that the procedure before the Board was inter partes (the defendant receives 
a copy of the application to reply within 30 days, the preparatory inquiries 
are adversarial, the file may be consulted by the parties and oral 
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observations may be presented by the parties at a public hearing).243 It also 
explained that the Board was independent and impartial because of the 
status of its members.244 
 
It is interesting to note that Advocate General Jarabo Colomer had argued 
in his Opinion that this body did not meet the criteria to be considered a 
court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU while asking the CJEU to 
provide a stricter concept.245 Although the CJEU did not follow his advice, 
it was somehow sensitive to Ruiz Jarabo’s Opinion in the sense that it 
provided a thorough analysis of the criteria to consider the Board as a 
court or tribunal for the purposes of the reference for a preliminary 
ruling.246  
 
The question arises as to whether this judgment could be applied by 
analogy to consider other similar bodies as having competence under 
article 267 TFEU. Nevertheless, it is worthy to point out that the 
examination by the CJEU was very specific to the particular situation of 
the Judicial Board of the Brussels-capital region. Consequently, it is not 
possible to determine any possible extension. The CJEU will need to 
analyse the circumstances of each professional body in light of the criteria 
which determine the condition of jurisdiction.   
 
7. Can an Ombudsman be Competent for the Preliminary Ruling? The 
Umweltanwalt von Kärnten Case 
In principle, ombudsmen only issue recommendations and critical 
assessments which are not legally binding.247 As such, they should not be 
competent to make use of the reference for a preliminary ruling.248 Public 
authorities are not obliged to comply with the ombudsmen’s opinions and 
complainants cannot require national courts and tribunals to enforce such 
opinions.249 However, some argue that ombudsmen should be entitled to 
make use of the procedure on the basis that these institutions work in a 
similar way to administrative courts and that public authorities generally 
comply with their opinions.250 In a similar way to administrative appeal 
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bodies, which are considered to be competent,251 'ombudsmen have a 
legitimate need for authoritative advice on the correct interpretation of 
EU law.'252 For that reason, it is interesting to analyse the case in the 
present subsection.  
 
In Umweltanwalt von Kärnten,253 the CJEU dealt with the consideration of 
an Environmental Ombudsman under article 267 TFEU. The case 
concerned a reference for a preliminary ruling about an interpretation of 
Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the 
effects of certain public and private projects on the environment.254 There 
was a dispute between the Umweltanwalt von Kärnten (Environment 
Ombudsman of Carinthia) and the Karntner Landesregierung (Government 
of the Province of Carinthia) related to the absence of environmental 
impact assessment for the construction of a cross-border power line 
between Italy and Austria.255 Directive 85/337 did not contain any provision 
for trans-boundary projects and the Government of the Province of 
Carinthia argued that no impact assessment was required since the length 
of the project on the Austrian territory did not reach the minimum 
threshold stipulated in national legislation.256 
 
The CJEU ruled that the Environmental ombudsman met the criteria to 
be considered a court or tribunal entitled to refer questions. After 
analysing Austrian Federal Laws on the Constitution and on the 
Umweltanwalt 2000,257 the CJEU concluded that it was a legally-
established, permanent and independent body with compulsory 
jurisdiction  which applies rules of law.258 It also found that the 
proceedings before the Environmental Ombudsman had inter partes 
nature.259 The CJEU determined not only that the Environmental 
Ombudsman’s decisions had the force of res judicata but also that they were 
reasoned and delivered in an open court.260 
 
Unfortunately, the judgment should not be extended by analogy to all 
ombudsmen. The evaluation carried out by the CJEU is confined to the 
specific circumstances of the Environmental Ombudsman in question. 
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Thus, the CJEU will need to examine future cases involving ombudsmen 
on a case-by-case basis.   
 
8. Can an Appeal Committee be Competent for a Preliminary Ruling? The 
Abrahamsson Case 
The Abrahamsson case261 concerned a request for a preliminary ruling by the 
Swedish Universities Appeals Board (Överklagandenämnden). Similarly to an 
appeal committee, this body deals with appeals against decisions made by 
higher education authorities in Sweden. The case involved a claim alleging 
discrimination by the Swedish University Boards of Appeal against a 
decision of the University of Gothenburg’s selection board for a position 
of professor.262 The vacancy notice had laid out the intention to use the 
appointment to promote gender equality and announced that positive 
discrimination might be utilised, as stipulated in national legislation which 
gave priority to candidates of an under-represented gender with sufficient 
qualifications for public posts.263  
 
The selection board finally chose Ms Fogelquevist, but two candidates 
appealed the decision before the Swedish University Boards of Appeal - 
Mr Anderson and Ms Abrahamsson.264 Whereas the first of them argued 
that the decision was contrary to national legislation and to case law of the 
CJEU,265 the second one based her appeal on the fact that her merits were 
better than those of the selected candidate.266 The Boards of Appeal 
directed several questions to the CJEU concerning the preclusion of 
national legislation by Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 
on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions.267  
 
By analysing the relevant national legislation,268 the CJEU considered the 
Swedish Universities Appeals Board a court or tribunal under article 267 
TFEU and admitted the reference.269 The CJEU explained that despite 
being an administrative authority, it was a permanent body invested with 
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judicial functions, applying rules of law and following an inter partes 
procedure while deciding independently and impartially.270  
 
This case proves that some administrative appeal boards in the EU may be 
considered  a court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU, despite the fact 
that they are administrative bodies under national law.271 However, the 
analysis of the CJEU is specific to the Swedish University Boards of 
Appeal. In fact, it was based on the national laws that secure the decisive 
independence of the Swedish Universities Appeals Board. Thus, it is not 
possible to extrapolate this case toother appeal committees as courts or 
tribunals entitled to make references to the CJEU. Such consideration 
should be individually assessed under the criteria laid out by Vaassen 
Göbbels.272 If such a committee meets the criteria, it will be a court or 
tribunal for the purposes of article 267 TFEU. However, it will not qualify 
as such if it does not comply with the criteria. Therefore, it is not feasible 
to infer general conclusions from this case as to whether appeal 
committees are courts or tribunals under article 267 TFEU since it will 
depend on a case-by-case analysis made by the CJEU.    
 
9. Can a Patent Court be Competent for the Preliminary Ruling? The Haüpl Case 
Some Member States have courts dealing with patent issues and also 
covering other intellectual property law problems arising from copyright 
and trademark. That is the case of the Supreme Patent and Trade Mark 
Adjudication Tribunal of Austria (Oberster Patent-und Markensenat). The 
Haüpl case273 considered the question whether a court like that could fall 
under article 267 TFEU. In a case like this, the CJEU also needs to verify 
that there is a real independence of the body.274 This condition is 
determined on the basis of the national laws ensuring it.275  
 
The Haupl case dealt with a reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
Supreme Patent and Trade Mark Adjudication Tribunal of Austria 
concerning an interpretation of the First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 
21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating 
to trademarks.276 Mr Haüpl was the applicant in the original proceedings 
and claimed that a trademark used by Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG should be 
cancelled in Austria due to a lack of use in the five-year period stipulated 
by the national legislation (1970 Austrian Law on the protection of 
trademarks).277 The Cancellation Division of the Austrian Patent Office 
had ruled that the trademark was no longer protected, but Lidl appealed 
against that finding before the Supreme Patent and Trade Mark 
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Adjudication Tribunal of Austria.278 The Tribunal raised two questions 
before the CJEU asking whether the date of the completion of the 
registration procedure is the start of the period of protection and what 
may constitute proper reasons excusing the non-use under the First 
Council Directive 89/104/EEC.279  
 
The CJEU determined whether this court was entitled to refer questions 
by analysing the 1970 Austrian Law on Patents.280 It found that the 
Supreme Patent and Trade Mark Adjudication Tribunal of Austria was a 
court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU. It argued that it satisfied the 
criterion related to the establishment by law since the aforementioned law 
set out its jurisdiction.281 This law also provided the independence of the 
tribunal because it established that its members were to perform their 
duties autonomously and their mandates could be extended every five years 
and could finish earlier if justified.282 The CJEU also found that the 
tribunal had a permanent nature due to the fact that the Austrian Patent 
Law provided no time limit for its jurisdiction to deal with appeals against 
decisions of both the Cancellation Division of the Austrian Patent Office 
and the Opposition Division of the Austrian Patent Office.283 It also 
claimed that the tribunal had compulsory jurisdiction on the grounds that 
the law established its competence to deal with appeals.284 By referring to 
the procedural rules contained in the Austrian Patent Law, the CJEU also 
considered that the tribunal applied rules of law and had an inter partes 
procedure. Once again, the analysis of the CJEU wass very specific to this 
tribunal since it was based on the national rules governing it. 
Consequently, similar tribunals in other Member States should be subject 
to an assessment by the CJEU in order to determine whether they satisfy 
the conditions to fall under article 267 TFEU.  
 
V. THE NEED FOR A CONCEPT OF A COURT OR TRIBUNAL UNDER 
ARTICLE 267 TFEU 
 
This section explains why there is a need to introduce a firmer concept of 
a court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU. The importance of preliminary 
rulings for the CJEU to develop EU law has already been outlined. It 
should be taken into account that only courts or tribunals from Member 
States are empowered to lodge preliminary rulings. However, the concept 
of a court or tribunal is not made on the basis of national legal systems, but 
through the case law of the CJEU. It has also been highlighted that the 
reasons for such consideration are based on the persuasiveness of the idea 
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of consistency and uniformity in the application of EU law. In fact, the EU 
Treaties do not define what a court or tribunal is. This definition has been 
created through the criteria developed by the CJEU over the years. 
However, these cannot be considered absolute requirements, but only 
mere guidelines.285 The case law of the CJEU suggests that some of those 
criteria are more important than others. Moreover, it is unclear whether 
those criteria are an exhaustive list or whether further additions may be 
made.286 Thus, the result up to this moment does not suggest that there 
will be a precise definition of who can make use of the preliminary ruling 
procedure and how it may be applied.287 As an area marked by 
disagreements between the Advocates General and the CJEU, it should be 
stressed that this problem has been raised within the CJEU.288 Therefore, 
there are several reasons to advocate for a firmer concept of a court or 
tribunal under article 267 TFEU. 
First of all, the relevant case law is very casuistic. Several 
AdvocatesGeneral have maintained that the case law on the subject is 
elastic, non-scientific and vague.289 It is difficult to extract general 
conclusions that could be valid for similar courts since the Court's 
reasoning is always very specific to the national body which made the 
reference. Thus, not even similar bodies in other Member States could get 
the same result by analogy because they would need their own analysis in 
order to be considered empowered to make a reference. On top of that, 
the CJEU has never expressed its position on the relative weighting of the 
relevant criteria to be considered a court or tribunal.290 As a result, it is not 
possible to derive an unambiguous definition of a court or tribunal under 
article 267 TFEU.291  
Secondly, there is legal uncertainty because the case law does not contain 
clear and precise components to define the concept.292 The framework is 
anything but certain as proven by the fact that the CJEU and the 
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Advocates General often do not agree.293 At times the CJEU has admitted 
references from bodies whose judicial functions may raise doubts without 
explaining the reasons why it considered them courts or tribunals under 
article 267 TFEU.294 It is clear that this lack of legal certainty has 
disadvantages.295 
On the other hand, a wider approach towards admitting references from 
bodies with a doubtful judicial function also has its advantages. For 
example, those bodies have been able to rely on the CJEU’s interpretation 
instead of having to come up with their own interpretation of the EU law; 
EU law has been clarified in cases which otherwise might not have made it 
to the CJEU, and; this might have reduced the number of appeals at the 
EU level.296  
However, it is important to remember that being considered a court or 
tribunal under article 267 TFEU provides an essential mechanism to 
guarantee the uniform application and interpretation of EU law. In fact, 
preliminary rulings constitute about one half of the CJEU's case load, and 
they have been responsible for the declaration of several fundamental 
principles of EU law.297 References for preliminary rulings are lodged in the 
course of legal proceedings where the judge needs an interpretation or to 
clarify the validity of European law in order to solve the dispute between 
the parties. Once a case is referred to the CJEU to resolve the questions, 
the process in the national court is paralysed waiting for the response. For 
this reason, anybody considering making a reference to the CJEU should 
know more or less in advance whether they can use it or not. The same 
goes for the parties in a legal procedure, who may consider referring 
questions to the CJEU as part of their procedural strategy to settle a 
dispute. In order  not to slow down the legal proceedings, it is important 
that judges making use of the preliminary ruling know in advance if they 
are empowered to do so. Otherwise, there is a risk of improperly delaying a 
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legal process while waiting for a response from the CJEU whose final 
answer might not admit the reference on the basis of lack of competence 
from the body who raised the question. This obviously has a negative 
impact on the efficacy of legal proceedings and justice as well as it creates 
false expectations for the parties, who are waiting for a ruling that will 
resolve their dispute. 
In the third place, it must be highlighted that at the beginning the idea 
was to encourage the use of the reference for a preliminary ruling.298 Thus, 
references were generally admitted for that purpose. However, once EU 
law becomes an integrated reality in the legal systems of the Member 
States, perhaps there is no longer a need for a wide concept. The wider the 
concept is, the more references will have to be admitted. That will in turn 
increase the CJEU’s workload. This outcome not only has negative 
consequences in terms of judicial economy, but also concerns the uniform 
application of EU law and the judicial cooperation foreseen by article 267 
TFEU, as well as it somehow endangers the European space of freedom, 
security and justice. To increase the CJEU’s workload may continue to 
delay in time its responses, thereby dissuading references for a preliminary 
ruling from national courts or tribunals that need a response in a 
reasonable time or that do not want to be exposed to a long and tiresome 
waiting time. Therefore, the risk stands in the possibility of each Member 
States’ court or tribunal deciding to create its own interpretation leading 
to the dispersion in the application of EU law.299 
In the fourth place, the General Court has competence, but has never 
dealt with references for preliminary rulings. If it is ever to exercise it, it is 
clear that there is a need for solid guidance from the CJEU about who 
exactly is empowered to make references. Otherwise, there is a risk that 
the General Court creates confusion by admitting references from bodies 
which should not be entitled to use the procedure enshrined in article 267 
TFEU. 
In the fifth place, the aim of the EU is not only to integrate the existing 
Member States, but also to enlarge by admitting new ones. These potential 
countries will always have their own judicial structure comprised of bodies 
of a different nature. They need to know if they can make use of the 
reference for a preliminary ruling.  
When talking about the need for a concept of a court or tribunal, it is clear 
that this concept must obviously be developed within the CJEU in order 
to ensure the uniformity of EU law. Besides, the concept should allow 
judicial bodies to be considered a court or tribunal under EU law.  
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A good and logical solution would be to as a general rule include under this 
concept all bodies belonging to the national judicial structure .300 In fact, 
they always qualify as a court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU, but their 
references should only be admitted when exercising a judicial function.301 
As a principle, references should not be admitted from bodies outside this 
structure, unless they are made by bodies outside of that structure whose 
decisions are final and undisputable.302 It does not seem convenient to 
admit references from bodies whose decisions might be later ignored in 
their legal system, but it is indeed wise to admit references from bodies 
whose decisions are final. The reason is always to ensure the uniform 
interpretation and application of EU law. In any case, the criteria laid out 
in Vaassen Göbbels may be perfectly applied to assess whether a court or 
tribunal is empowered or not to make the reference.   
This approach should reduce the workload of the CJEU. This is because it 
would receive fewer references, in which case it could focus on developing 
a much firmer doctrine.303 If the body making the reference is part of the 
national judicial structure, then the CJEU should only verify whether or 
not it is exercising judicial functions.304 If it is not part of such a structure, 
then the analysis on the basis of the Vassen Göbbels criteria should be 
applied. However, those bodies that are outside the judicial structure 
would already know that they have to undergo such an analysis, thereby 
considering it beforehand if they meet the criteria or not.  
As a consequence of the CJEU having fewer references, there would also 
be lower risk of delaying the procedures and discouraging bodies to refer 
because of a fear of getting a late reply. The more references are admitted, 
the more work for the CJEU and the longer the processes will be. Thus, 
national judges might be pessimistic about referring to the CJEU if they 
believe that it will only extend the procedure in time. It is clear that 
nobody wants to be waiting in a long process, therefore alternative 
solutions are always being sought. However, in this particular case, there is 
a risk that the alternative solution is to not go to the CJEU in order to 
avoid a long and uncertain process where there is no legal certainty that 
the reference will be admitted.  
One criticism to this approach is that it is very restrictive and would 
impede the possibility of making a reference for a preliminary ruling for 
administrative bodies.305 Moreover, the effects of a wider approach 
towards the concept of court or tribunal in the European legal order and in 
the national legal system of each Member State should be considered. To 
admit references from bodies that do not belong to the judicial branch 
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means conferring powers not recognised at the national level. This could 
even alter the constitutional order in the Member State concerned. 
National judges are competent to apply EU law; they must ensure its 
efficacy and stop applying those provisions from national legislation that 
are contrary to EU law.306 Admitting references from bodies that do not 
belong to the judicial branch of a Member State makes them somehow 
European judges. The question is what happens when a judge carries out 
such a task, but does not have full competences within his national legal 
system? It is difficult to determine how somebody outside  the Member 
State’s judicial branch can have the aforementioned competences. In fact, 
it is more likely that he cannot undertake them in a complete and effective 
way, thereby compromising the efficacy of EU law. A clear example is the 
revision that a court or tribunal could make about the decision taken by an 
administrative body after receiving the response from a reference to a 
preliminary ruling lodged before the CJEU. Decisions by administrative 
bodies can afterwards be reviewed by courts or tribunals. Thus, a court 
revising the decision would be constrained by the ruling of the CJEU, but 
that does not prevent it from considering the reference unnecessary or 
considering that it should have been written in a different way. This 
creates a possibility to revise a reference which has already been dealt with. 
All of this is said without forgetting another important point: the potential 
lack of independence and immobility of the members of an administrative 
body depending on how they are appointed or dismissed.307Another 
problem with considering administrative bodies courts or tribunals under 
article 267 TFEU is that they are governed by the rule of administrative 
silence, which may have consequences if there is no  reply within a 
concrete period of time. As previously mentioned, a wider concept of a 
court or tribunal can increase the number of references and create more 
delays in the responses from the CJEU. It may lead to problems if an 
administrative body does not provide a reply within a specific period of 
time because it is waiting for the CJEU to answer its questions.  
For all the reasons explained above, it is clear that there is a need for a 
firmer concept of a court or tribunal under article 267 TFEU. Taking into 
consideration the idiosyncrasies of the administrative and judicial systems 
of each Member State, in order to provide an effective and efficient 
response the solution would be to provide assistance to facilitate, reinforce 
and simplify the important task of the CJEU when using the reference for 
a preliminary ruling to continue developing EU law and ensuring its 
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The reference for a preliminary ruling is an important procedure which can 
be exercised by national judges. The aim of this procedure is to foster 
cooperation between national and European judges when interpreting and 
checking the validity of EU law. Depending on what the reference is 
seeking (either an interpretation or an assessment of the validity of EU 
law), the effects are significant but also different because an interpretation 
is binding for all courts in the Member States, whereas a declaration of 
invalidity obliges the relevant European institution to remedy the 
situation, which extends to all acts adopted based on the invalid law.   
 
The judgments of the CJEU have been very important for developing EU 
law308 and the reference for a preliminary ruling procedure has become an 
essential tool to clarify doubts and concerns as well as to serve as the 
ultimate examiner of the validity of the acts.309 That is why it is essential to 
clarify who exactly is empowered to make use of it. Only national judges 
are authorised to do so, but each Member State has its own legal system 
and not all the judicial courts are considered as such in other countries.  
 
The CJEU has preferred to establish the criteria for a European concept of 
a court or tribunal itself, rather than leaving the issue to the Member 
States. This makes sense since uniform interpretation and application of 
EU law is at stake. Despite the fact that the CJEU ruled on the criteria to 
be considered a court or tribunal along time ago, there have been some 
additions, clarifications and departures from those original requirements.  
 
It is interesting to note that the criteria were established in 1965 in the 
Vaassen Göbbels case. However, the important criterion of independence 
was added in the Corbiau case in 1987, which seems a long time for not 
having considered it. Judges are said to be independent, impartial and 
immovable. Thus, it is surprising that it took so much time to take that 
particular requirement into account.310 However, the CJEU seems to have 
relaxed this criterion, as seen in later cases.311  
 
Some of the criteria established in Vaassen Göbbels remain unchanged 
(establishment by law, continuity and decision in law) whereas some others 
have received a much more confused interpretation. The problem is that 
those other criteria are independence, adversarial process or juridical 
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nature of the decision, which all seem to be more essential for a correct 
judicial function than the unaltered criteria.312  
 
In this sense, more clarity is needed in the concept of a court or tribunal as 
established for the purposes of the reference for a preliminary ruling since 
lack of a firm concept and the hesitation in the judgments are capable of 
creating legal uncertainty. The Gabalfrisa case has been especially eloquent, 
whereas other ones such as Nordsee and Syfait are characterised by their 
soundness. On top of that, the issue is ongoing since there are always cases 
where the CJEU rejects the admissibility of the reference from courts 
which are not authorised, but where they would not have made use of it if 
the concept were more precise.313 The CJEU should not waste time 
considering the admission or non-admission of references based on the 
competence of the national court. If it does so, it introduces the risks of 
slowing down justice and creating legal uncertainty.314 Furthermore, the 
EU is composed of 28 Member States whose judicial systems deserve to 
know exactly who may or may not pose a question to the CJEU. Besides, 
the trend is towards the enlargement of the EU, with more countries 
whose systems are even more diverse. For that purpose, the concept of a 
court or tribunal should be firmer for national courts to have a sound 
reference. That would be an advantage for the CJEU since references 
would then only come from bodies which already knew that they are 
competent to make a reference. Thus, the CJEU would just need to verify 
that the circumstances of the case allow such bodies to refer the question.   
 
The CJEU has a key task of interpreting and guiding the development of 
EU law. In that responsibility, the reference for a preliminary ruling is very 
useful. It should not be forgotten that EU law has been formulated 
through the judgements of the CJEU. The wider the concept of a court or 
tribunal, the higher the number of bodies that will be empowered to make 
use of the reference for a preliminary ruling and thus, the more references 
will be made. This will mean more work for the CJEU. As the reference 
                                                
312 See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster 
Coster [2001] ECR I-9445, para 18.  
313 See cases C-363/11 Epitropos tou Elegktikou Synedriou sto Ypourgeio Politismou kai 
Tourismou v Ypourgeio Politismou kai Tourismou - Ypiresia Dimosionomikou Elenchou 
[2012] ECR I-00000; and C-394/11 Valeri Hariev Belov v CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD 
and Others European [2013] ECR I-00000, C 222/13 TDC A/S v Erhvervsstyrelsen [2014] 
,not yet published, and; Opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen in Case C-
203/14 Consorci Sanitari del Maresme [2015], not yet published. 
314 See Opinion of Advocate General Nils Wahl in Case C 497/12 Davide Gullotta 
and Farmacia di Gullotta Davide & C. Sas v Ministero della Salute and Azienda Sanitaria 
Provinciale di Catania [2015], not yet published, para 90, where he states:  
Every case dismissed on procedural grounds results in a significant 
waste of resources for both the national court making the 
reference and the EU judiciary (in particular, because of the 
required translation of the order for reference into all official 
languages of the European Union). The administration of justice is 
also delayed vis-à-vis the parties in the main proceedings, without 
producing any benefits. 
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for a preliminary ruling is a dialogue between judges with the aim of 
fostering the uniform interpretation and application of EU law, there is a 
risk of undermining such uniformity in the case that non-judicial bodies in 
a strict sense are allowed to make use of the procedure315. Therefore, it 
seems logical that the CJEU further develops a much clearer European 
concept of a court or tribunal.  
 
Moreover and as aforementioned, the CJEU should not waste time 
assessing whether a certain body meets the criteria to be considered as 
meeting the concept of a court or tribunal. It should already know in 
advance who is authorised, or at least have a clear idea beforehand. Only 
those cases where there are doubts on the exercise of the jurisdictional 
function by a judicial body should be evaluated. This problem would be 
solved if it were up to the Member States to decide what national courts, 
tribunals and bodies are considered jurisdiction; however, that solution was 
considered and rejected in favour of the development of a European 
concept, which makes more sense for the purposes of uniform application 
of EU law. This is important since it should be noted that legal disputes 
involve parties who expect to settle their disputes by litigating. Those 
parties aim for quick decisions because even if courts rule in their favour, 
any delay threatens to harm their interests by fulfilling the legal maxim 
“justice delayed is justice denied”. From the moment that a national judge 
refers to the CJEU, the litigation procedure at national level stops until it 
decides. Thus, there is an issue at stake and the CJEU should be expected 
to provide an answer within due time.316 Consequently, the consideration 
of the admission of the reference threatens to delay a process that could be 
expedited if the concept of a court or tribunal was much clearer than it is 
currently.  
                                                
315 See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster 
Coster [2001] ECR I-9445, paras 76-77 and 79.  
316 The Court has ruled that failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time constitutes 
a procedural irregularity. See Case C-185/95 P. Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] 
ECR I-08417 para 48.   
